Introduction
The completeness proof for rst-order logic by Rasiowa and Sikorski 13] is a simpli cation of Henkin's proof 7] in that it avoids the addition of in nitely many new individual constants. Instead they show that each consistent set of formulae can be extended to a maximally consistent set, satisfying the following existence property: if it contains (9x) it also contains some substitution (y=x) of a variable y for x. In Feferman's review 5] of 13], an improvement, due to Tarski, is given by which the proof gets a simple algebraic form. Sambin 15] used the same method in the setting of formal topology 16], thereby obtaining a constructive completeness proof. This proof is elementary and can be seen as a constructive and predicative version of the one in Feferman's review. It is a typical, and simple, example where the use of formal topology gives constructive sense to the existence of a generic object, satisfying some forcing conditions; in this case an ultra lter satisfying the existence property.
In order to get a formal topology on the set of rst-order formulae, Sambin used the Dedekind-MacNeille completion to de ne a covering relation DM . This method, by which an arbitrary poset can be extended to a complete poset, was introduced by MacNeille 9] and is a generalization of the construction of real numbers from rationals by Dedekind cuts. It is also possible to de ne an inductive cover, I , on the set of formulae, which can also be used to give canonical models, see Coquand and Smith 3] . Proof-theoretically, one can notice that I is given by a generalized inductive de nition, while the de nition of DM is elementary.
Given that Sambin's completeness proof can be seen as a constructive version of the Henkin-Rasiowa-Sikorski proof, it was natural to conjecture that the points of this topology correspond to Henkin sets; this conjecture appears in 15]. For the inductive topology, it is easy to see that the points correspond to Henkin sets. Hence, the natural question: do these two topologies coincide? We show in this paper that the question has a simple negative answer. This raised further natural questions on what can be said about the points of these two topologies; we give some answers.
The observation that topological models for rst-order theories can expressed in the framework of locales appears, for instance, in Fourman and Grayson 6] , where the analogy between points of a locale and models of a theory is emphasised; the identi cation of formal points with Henkin sets, gives a precise form to this analogy. We replace the use of locales by formal topology, which can be expressed in a predicative framework such as Martin-L of's type theory. Proof-theoretic issues are also considered by Dragalin 4] , who presents a topological completeness proof using only nitary inductive de nitions. Palmgren and Moerdijk 10] is also concerned with constructions of models: using sheaf semantics, they obtain a stronger conservativity result than the one in 3].
We will rst investigate the di erence between the Dedekind-MacNeille cover and the inductive cover. It easy to see that DM is stronger than I , that is, I U implies DM U, but the converse does not hold in general.
The notion of point is not primitive in formal topology and therefore it is natural to require that a formal topology has some notion of positivity de ned on the basic neighbourhoods; that a neighbourhood is positive then corresponds to, in ordinary point based topology, that it is inhabited by some point. We will show several negative results on positivity, both for the inductive topology and the Dedekind-MacNeille topology. The points of an inductive topology correspond to Henkin sets, but the Dedekind-MacNeille topology has, in general, no points.
Our reasoning is constructive and, in the same way as Bishop's 1], neutral in the sense that no principles that contradicts classical mathematics are used. The meta-theory is weak: all arguments can be carried out in Martin-L of's type theory without universes 17, 11] . However, we will be informal and the paper can be read without any knowledge of type theory. We only want to point out that our reasoning is predicative, hence we make a distinction between sets and types. Sets are inductively de ned and form the objects of the type Set. Subsets of a set S are propositional functions, that is, they are objects of the function type S ! Set. If U is a subset of S and a 2 S, we usually write a U for the judgement U(a) true.
Formal topology has been developed in computer systems for type theory 2]; in particular, the completeness proof in 15] has been checked in the ALF system 12].
Some of the results in this paper rst appeared in Sara Sadocco's tesi di laurea 14].
De nition of formal space
A formal topology, as de ned by Sambin 16] , is a commutative idempotent monoid hS; ; 1i with a covering relation , that is, a relation between elements of the set S and subsets of S which satis es the following rules. For the details of formal topology in a type theoretic setting, we refer to Sambin 16] .
In this paper, S will always be the set of formulae of some arbitrary rstorder theory T, with classical or intuitionistic logic, and`T the derivability relation of T. We let , and denote arbitrary formulae of T. The monoid operation is the conjunction, that is, = & , and the unit 1 is the true proposition >. The equality of the monoid is provable equivalence, that is, = if and only if`T $ . We will use the quanti ers 8 and 9 both informally and in rst-order formulae, but the meaning will always be clear from the context.
Covers on the set of rst-order formulae
For the rst de ntion of a cover, we use MacNeille's method 9], by which an arbitrary poset can be extended to a complete poset. In our case, the partial ordering is induced by the derivability relation of a rst-order theory T. Let be a an arbitrary formula of T and U an arbitrary subset of formulae of T.
The Dedekind-MacNeille covering, DM , is de ned by
So is covered by a subset U if and only if every formula that can be proved from each of the formulae in U can also be proved from . As we will show in this section, the converse does not hold. A covering relation induces a partial order on the type of subsets of the set S of basic neighbourhoods by letting U V mean that every element of U is covered by V , i.e. U V . If U I is a family of subsets over the set I, then an immediate consequence of the rules for a covering relation is that the supremum of U I exists and is equal to the union of the family.
If the subset U has a supremum with respect to a partial order , we let sup U denote the supremum. The Dedekind-MacNeille completion has the property that suprema that exist in hFrm T ;`T i are preserved: Proposition 3 Let U = ffug : u Ug. Then sup`T U = implies sup DM U = f g.
Proof. Immediate consequence of the de nition of DM .
In the proof of the next theorem, we will use the notion of inductive subset. Proof. Let T P be a theory with only one predicate symbol P and no non-logical axioms. Let X + Y , with X in nite and Y nonempty, be a partition of the set of variables and let U X = fP(y) : y Xg. We will show that 9xP(x) DM U X but not 9xP(x) I U X . To prove that 9xP(x) DM U X we must show that if P(y)`T P for all y X, then 9xP(x)`T P . Since X is in nite, there exist a z X which does not occur in ; hence P(z)`T P gives 9xP(x)`T P .
De ne the subset V on the formulae of T P by V , (9y 1 9y k X)( `T P P(y 1 ) _ _ P(y k )) Using that Y is nonempty, it is easy to see that V is an inductive subset and that U X V . Hence, by the lemma, 9xP(x) I U X ) 9xP(x) V . But, clearly, 9xP(x) V does not hold.
From the proof of theorem 1 we see that sup`T P U X = 9xP(x) and sup I U X 6 = 9xP(x). Hence proposition 3 does not hold if we replace DM by I : Corollary 2 In general, the inductive cover does not preserve suprema from the poset hFrm T ;`T i.
A cover is a Stone cover if a U implies that there is a nite subset U 0 of U such that a U 0 .
Proposition 4 Neither DM nor I are in general Stone covers.
Proof. Assume that the inductive cover is Stone. By the de nition of the inductive cover, 9x (x) I f (t) : t arbitrary termg. For any theory T we would then have, by proposition 2, 9x (x)`T (t 1 ) _ _ (t n ) which clearly does not hold.
Assume that the Dedekind-MacNeille cover is Stone. By theorem 1, I U implies DM U; hence, by corollary 1, also the inductive would be Stone.
The Stone compacti cation ! of a cover is de ned by a ! U if there exists a nite subset U 0 of U such that a U 0 .
From corollary 1 we see that the covers I and DM have the same Stone compacti cation. Proof. Assume POS( ). Then I ; implies that ; is inhabited. Since ( `T ?) gives that I ;, we obtain :( `T ?).
For the implication in the other direction, we must prove that :( `T ?) and I U implies U inhabited; we do that by proving the stronger proposition I U ) ( 
by a straightforward induction on the derivation of I U. Note that this proposition implies that if U is empty then I U implies `T ?; hence, I ; , ( `T ?) since the implication in the other direction is an immediate consequence of the de nition of inductive cover; we will use this equivalence in the proof of the corollary below. By propositions 5 and 6, if the inductive topology has a positivity predicate then Pos( ) , :( `T ?): By the proof of proposition 6, we have I ; , ( `T ?). Hence, by the second rule for Pos, (:( `T ?) ) ( `T ?)) ) ( `T ?) which gives ::( `T ?) ) ( `T ?): Let R be an arbitrary decidable predicate on the natural numbers and let T R be the theory which has no nonlogical symbols and the axioms Ax n de ned by
Clearly, T R is inconsistent if and only if 9xR(x); so, ::(`T R ?) ) (`T R ?) implies ::(9xR(x)) ) (9xR(x)): Hence, we obtain Corollary 3 If every inductive topology admits a positivity predicate Pos, then
Markov's principle holds.
We say that a space is positive if, for every subset U, 1 is covered by U implies that U is inhabited. Note that a space is positive if and only if POS(1) holds. Every space with a positivity predicate Pos such that Pos(1) holds is positive; this follows immediately from the axioms for Pos and the fact that 
By putting equal to 1 and U equal to f1 : Ag in (2) we obtain (1), provided the theory is consistent.
The following theorem shows that there is no hope to prove constructively that any Dedekind-MacNeille topology is positive. 
T is equivalent to (9n)Proof ( ; n) where Proof is a decidable predicate over the natural number, expressing that n codes a proof of in T. Assume, for each formula , ::(9n)Proof ( ; n) ) (9n)Proof ( ; n) (5) Since, for all propositions B and C, ::C ) C implies (::B ) ((B ) C) ) C), we obtain from (5) ::A ) (8 ) 
(4) and (6) give that ::A ) A: Hence, since A is an arbitrary proposition, Markov's principle implies the full law of the excluded middle. Note that the proof shows that if a theory is decidable, then positivity of the Dedekind-MacNeille topology implies the full law of the excluded middle.
Points
We say that S is a point of a topology hS; ; 1; i if it satis es the following rules: Theorem 3 In general, the Dedekind-MacNeille topology for a rst-order theory has no points.
Proof. Let T be a theory with classical logic, an in nite number of atomic formulae and no non-logical axioms. We will show that the Dedekind-MacNeille topology for T has no points. Assume that is a point. De ne the subset V by V = f : (: )g and let be an arbitrary formula and At be an atomic formula which does not occur in . Then At`T or :At`T implies`T ; hence (8 2 V ) `T )`T which gives that 1 DM V . Since is a point we then get that there must exist a formula 2 V such that ( ), which is impossible since then ( &: ). This theorem was pointed out to one of us by John Bell in a classical metatheory. It is then well-known that a complete atomless boolean algebra has no points, and it is easy to check that the Dedekind-MacNeille completion of an atomless boolean algebra is atomless.
It is a direct consequence of the de nitions that if a topology has a point, then the topology is positive. Hence, theorem 2 gives Corollary 4 If the Dedekind-MacNeille topology for a theory has a point, then
Markov's principle implies the full law of the excluded middle.
We say that a formal topology hS; ; 1; i is pointwise de nable if there exists a set X and a relation k? from X to S such that a U , (8x 2 X)(x k? a ) x k? U) where x k? U means that (9b U)(x k? b). Corollary 5 If every inductive topology is pointwise de nable, then Markov's principle holds.
Proof. If the topology is pointwise de nable, then a positivity predicate can be de ned by Pos( ) = (9x 2 X)(x k? ). Hence, the result follows from corollary 3.
7 Set based topologies A disadvantage of the de nition of formal topology that we have used is that, in general, it is not clear how to form the Cartesian product of two spaces. A natural way to change the de nition so that the Cartesian product of two spaces always can be formed is to require that it is set based. A formal topology is set based if there exists a set I and a family of subsets U i over I such that, for any subset U, a U , (9i 2 I)(a U i and U i U)
